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Abstract 
 
Climate change has become a critical issue in the international policy 
making agenda. At the UNFCC conference in Bali 2007, countries 
decided on a roadmap to achieve a ‘secure climate future’. Given the 
commitment to limit the temperature increase to 2° Celsius relative to the 
preindustrial levels, the EU decided in March 2007, as a first step, a 20% 
reduction of its GHG emissions by 2020, going to 30% if a 
comprehensive international agreement can be reached. This study uses 
the multi-sector multi-region world model GEM-E3 in order to identify 
the world economic implications of different participation schemes for 
post Kyoto. The scenarios reported in this paper have contributed to the 
EU communication on ‘Limiting Global Change to 2° Celsius the way 
ahead to 2020 and beyond’.  
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1. Introduction 
Climate change has become a critical issue in the international policy 
making agenda. At the UNFCC conference in Bali 2007, countries 
decided on a roadmap to achieve a ‘secure climate future’. Towards this 
end EU decided in March 2007 a 20% reduction relative to 1990 levels, 
of its GHG emissions by 2020, going to 30% if a comprehensive 
international agreement can be reached.  
 
Given the stringency of the EU 2° target objective there is clearly the 
need of expanding the participation beyond the Kyoto scheme to achieve 
it. Moreover, integration of the fast growing and developing countries in 
this scheme can be important because their lower cost of abatement and 
the future growth of their emissions and hence their future contribution to 
climate change. Therefore, besides the global target, an allocation of 
emission between countries and their dynamic pathway have to be 
defined. The initial allocation is essential for distributional equity 
concerns.  
 
The focus of this paper is the evaluation of different participation 
schemes for reaching a global emission reduction level sufficient for 
reaching the 2° target. The need or desirability of GHG emission 
reduction for climate change is considered as given EC, (2005). The 
scenarios reported in this paper have contributed to the EC (2007) and are 
partly also reported in Russ, et.al (2007). The evaluation is done with the 
computable general equilibrium model, GEM-E31 World. The GEM-E3 
model is a multi sector, multi country, recursive dynamic general 
equilibrium model covering the whole world aggregated to 20 regions 
and 18 sectors. It includes all GHG emissions (except those related to 
land use change). 
 
The paper is structured in four sections, in addition to this introduction. 
Section 1 gives a brief overview of the baseline scenario as it partly 
conditions the climate policy scenario and provides the basis against 
which all policy scenarios are compared. Section 2 explains the 
assumptions behind the global reduction scenario, in particular the 
allocation of targets between countries and the timing of their 
                                                   
1 A complete description of the GEM-E3 model can be found in Capros, et al.(1997), Van Regemorter, 
(2005).   
 
 
participation. In Section 3 the global scenarios are presented and 
analysed. Section 4 extends and complements the analysis of the previous 
scenario along several lines: autonomous EU policy (instead of global 
reduction efforts), impact when there is increased international capital 
mobility, and also when regions cannot run additional current account 
deficits in order to meet the emission constraint. Section 5 summarises 
the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
2. Baseline scenario 
This section summarises the main elements of the baseline scenario of the 
GEM-E3 model. It is the scenario against which the reduction scenarios 
are evaluated and thus influences the magnitude of the emission 
reduction effort to reach the target. The GTAP (v.6) database has been 
used to calibrate the GEM-E3 model to its base year, 2001. The regional 
and sectoral coverage of the GEM-E3-World model is given in annex. 
The simulation period extents up to 2030 with a 5 year time step. As 
indicated in the annex GEM-E3 identifies four groups of energy intensive 
industries, that is: electricity, ferrous & non ferrous metals, chemical 
industry and other energy intensive. The model does not include 
endogenous technical change (this feature is implemented in the 
European version of the GEM-E3) and has no backstop technologies for 
very high emission reduction. 
 
Assumptions on GDP and CO2 emissions growth up to 2030 are in 
concordance with the POLES baseline scenario developed within the EU 
impact assessment Russ, et.al (2007) and Russ, et.al (2005) . The GEM-
E3 baseline is in line with the evolution observed in the past decade: 
energy efficiency improvement, dematerialisation of the developed 
economies (i.e. improved technical progress) and slow catch up by the 
developing economies.  
 
In GEM-E3, all markets are competitive including the labour market. The 
dynamic of the sectoral capital stock is driven by the investment flows, 
with the allocation of the investment between sectors based on the 
sectoral profitability. Within one period, capital is assumed to be mobile 
across sectors within a region, but not across regions. This relative capital 
mobility can be interpreted as reflecting expectations not well represented 
in a dynamic recursive model as GEM-E3. Over periods capital is mobile 
between regions through investment. As a sensitivity test, the possibility 
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of capital mobility within a period between sectors and between regions 
is also considered. 
 
Table 1 presents the regional GDP levels for 2001 and the annual GDP 
growth rates for the 2005-2030 period. 
 
 
Table 1: GDP in the reference case (annual growth rates) 
 
 
 2010/2015 2015/2020 2020/2025 2025/2030 
Canada 2.71% 2.38% 2.20% 1.71% 
USA 3.05% 2.79% 2.54% 1.86% 
Australia & New 
Zealand 
2.53% 2.67% 3.02% 2.51% 
Japan 1.75% 1.99% 2.50% 1.95% 
EU27 2.02% 1.91% 1.84% 1.32% 
Other European 
countries 
2.44% 2.69% 2.88% 2.39% 
South & East 
Mediterranean 
Countries 
3.96% 3.71% 3.09% 3.84% 
Former Soviet Union 5.04% 3.76% 3.95% 2.84% 
Middle East 3.40% 3.29% 2.06% 5.78% 
Middle Africa 3.84% 4.10% 4.73% 4.99% 
South Africa 4.10% 4.16% 4.80% 4.52% 
India 4.71% 4.90% 4.74% 5.06% 
China 5.00% 4.55% 4.24% 3.88% 
East South East Asia 3.88% 3.51% 3.21% 2.98% 
Rest of Asia 3.89% 3.27% 3.13% 3.25% 
Mexico & Venezuela 3.71% 4.30% 4.62% 4.92% 
Brazil 3.44% 3.44% 3.82% 4.17% 
Rest of Latin America 3.74% 3.80% 4.17% 4.43% 
World 2.95% 2.83% 2.77% 2.44% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The evolution of the GHG emissions is given in Table 2. The world 
GHG emissions in 2030 are 70% higher than the 2001 emissions and 
72% compared to 1990 emissions. 
 
 
Table 2: GHG emissions in the reference case (annual growth rates) 
 
 
 2010/2015 2015/2020 2020/2025 2025/2030 
Canada 1.88% 1.37% 1.25% 0.66% 
USA 2.46% 1.60% 1.27% 0.44% 
Australia & New 
Zealand 0.85% 0.55% 1.05% 0.60% 
Japan 0.95% 1.10% 0.93% 0.63% 
EU27 1.56% 0.70% 0.57% 0.32% 
Other European 
countries 
0.64% 0.72% 1.10% 0.70% 
South & East 
Mediterranean 
Countries 
2.03% 2.36% 1.35% 1.90% 
Former Soviet Union 2.97% 1.57% 0.73% 0.04% 
Middle East 1.51% 4.14% 0.10% 4.28% 
Middle Africa 1.81% 2.43% 2.47% 2.94% 
South Africa 1.61% 1.97% 2.06% 2.16% 
India 3.53% 3.28% 3.15% 3.28% 
China 3.63% 3.14% 2.06% 1.59% 
East South East Asia 1.60% 1.51% 1.34% 1.29% 
Rest of Asia 3.84% 3.95% 4.37% 5.29% 
Mexico & Venezuela 1.31% 2.32% 2.38% 2.46% 
Brazil -0.08% 0.49% 1.31% 2.00% 
Rest of Latin America 1.20% 1.87% 2.04% 2.37% 
World 2.38% 2.01% 1.53% 1.41% 
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3. GHG emission reduction targets and their allocation 
3.1. Definition of the GHG targets and their allocation 
The implementation of a certain global GHG emissions reduction target 
in GEM-E3 requires. i) the determination of the GHG emission reduction 
target at a world level, ii) the allocation of the global target among the 
groups of countries(defined according to certain criteria) and the 
allocation of the group target to the regions of each group. 
 
The global target was set to a reduction of 30% by 2050 compared to 
1990 for the world as a whole  (Russ, et.al (2007)). The proposed level of 
the target results in an emissions scenario which gives a 50% chance to 
limit the temperature increase by 2 degrees C relative to the pre-industrial 
level. The required global emission reduction was allocated to the 
different regions depending on their level of development. The 
participation schedule for each region to the global carbon market is 
based on the assumption that the carbon market only gradually develops 
into a global market.  
 
The GEM-E3 model countries have been grouped to define their 
participation in the climate policy for the GEM-E3 simulations. The 
number of potential regional groups is conditioned by the country/regions 
already identified in the model(cf. Annex 1), that is eighteen in total. 
Three groups have been defined as: 
 
· Group 1 (Annex I countries). These are the Annex I countries: 
Australia & New Zealand (AUZ), Japan (JPN), Canada (CAN), USA, 
EU27, Other European countries (OEU), and Former Soviet Union 
(FSU). 
· Group 2 (fast growing developing economies): Mexico & Venezuela 
(MEV), South & East Mediterranean Countries (MED), Middle East 
(MEA), East South East Asia (EAS). These countries have a target 
from 2020 onwards 
· Group 3 (rest of the world): Brazil (BRA), Rest of Latin America 
(LAM), India (IND), China (CHN), Rest of Asia (RAS), and South 
Africa (SAFR). These economies have a gradually increasing target 
from 2030 onwards. 
 
 
Note that the eighteenth region of the model, Middle Africa (MAFR), 
does not have to reduce its emissions and therefore is not included in any 
group. 
 
These three country groupings take on reduction commitments at 
different timing, the following pattern of participation (who does how 
much, and when) was implemented: 
 
· 2010. Only the Annex I countries have targets, according to the 
Kyoto Protocol, except for the USA for which an annual energy 
efficiency improvement of 1% per year is assumed. 
· 2020. For this period Group 2 countries also have a target: 
o -31% versus 1990 for Annex I countries (Group 1)  
o +21% versus 1990 for fast growing countries (Group 2) 
· 2025. As in the previous period, both Groups 1 and 2 do have targets: 
o -34% versus 1990 for Annex I countries (Group 1)  
o +20% versus 1990 for fast growing countries (Group 2) 
· 2030. Group 3 also joins the mitigation efforts: 
o -55% versus 1990 for Annex I countries (Group 1)  
o +3% versus 1990 for fast growing countries (Group 2) 
o +135% versus 1990 for the rest of the world (Group 3) 
· 2050. The three groups adopt much more stringent targets, which 
translates into emission reduction at the world of 30% versus 1990: 
o -75% versus 1990 for Annex I countries (Group 1)  
o -43% versus 1990 for fast growing countries (Group 2) 
o +94% versus 1990 for the rest of the world (Group 3) 
The Group 3 can still increase their emissions compared to 2001 or 1990, 
these targets imply however a reduction of 12% in 2030 and of 50% in 
2050 compared to the baseline. 
 
Table 3 hereafter summarizes the assumptions and the targets they imply 
for the different groups, both compared to 1990 and 2001. 
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Table 3: Emission reduction targets of the groups 
 
  GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 WORLD 
2010 % vs 1990 -6%    
 % vs 2001 4%    
2015 % vs 1990 -14%    
 % vs 2001 -5%    
2020 % vs 1990 -31% 21%   
 % vs 2001 -24% 2%   
2025 % vs 1990 -34% 20%   
 % vs 2001 -27% 1%   
2030 % vs 1990 -55% 3% 135% 8% 
 % vs 2001 -51% -13% 96% 6% 
2050 % vs 1990 -75% -43% 94% -25% 
 % vs 2001 -73% -52% 62% -26% 
 
 
The final stage in formulating the targets in the model is the allocation of 
the group (Group 1 to 3) targets to the countries. The allocation between 
regions/countries within the groups is based on the grandfathering 
principle. For the Group 1 countries, it is based on the average between 
their base year emissions (2001) and their 1990 emissions, while for the 
other groups it is based on their baseline emissions in the corresponding 
year such as not to penalize the fast growing countries. 
 
3.2. Implementation of the climate policy in GEM-E3 
3.2.1. Policy instrument 
The policy instrument chosen for the implementation of the climate 
policy is emission trading. A distinction is made between the energy 
intensive sectors and the other sectors:  
 
· Energy intensive sectors: a world emission trading system (ETS), i.e. 
an international emission trading system for these sectors between all 
groups contributing to the target 
· Other sectors: a domestic trading system for household and sectors 
not included in the ETS 
 
 
The use of clean development mechanisms (CDM) is possible depending 
on the scenarios but it is limited to the sectors participating in the ETS. In 
GEM-E3 the energy intensive sectors are: the electricity sector, the 
ferrous and non ferrous metal sectors, the chemical sector for its activity 
generating emissions and the other energy intensive sectors (non metallic 
mineral and paper & pulp). 
 
The allocation of the reduction target for a region between energy 
intensive sectors (which can participate in the world wide ETS) and the 
other sectors is based on cost efficiency within the country/region. The 
distinction between ETS and non ETS limits the overall flexibility of the 
global market, it is implemented to reflect the difficulty and the 
transaction cost of putting up a full global market. 
3.2.2. Modelling assumptions 
There are three key assumptions in the model runs related to its closure 
rules. Firstly, in order to prevent the climate policy from being financed 
through running public deficit, public budget neutrality is ensured 
through lump sum transfer. This means that in the climate policy scenario 
the net savings position of the public sector in every country of the model 
remain unchanged compared to the reference case. 
 
Secondly, no specific constraint is imposed on the current account2. In a 
sensitivity scenario it is assumed that the current account of each region 
as a share to GDP remains fixed to the baseline level to evaluate the 
impact of capital flows.  
 
Finally, as in the baseline scenario, capital is mobile between sectors 
within a region but not between regions; the impact of this assumption 
will also be analysed in a sensitivity scenario allowing full capital 
mobility between sectors and regions within one period. 
 
 
4. The global scenarios 
4.1. Definition of the scenarios 
                                                   
2 The global current account is zero by construction in a CGE model. 
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Based on the assumptions described in the previous section, different 
global scenarios (with the participation of all regions at some points of 
time) have been defined. The first of the scenarios (called ‘Scenario 1, 
early participation’) is the broad participation case of the EC impact 
assessment (Variant 1 in section 6.2.5). This scenario has relatively a 
high degree of flexibility because from 2020 Group 1 and Group 2 
countries can benefit from low cost abatement possibilities in Group 3 
countries. In particular, four large countries in Group 3 (Brazil, other 
Latin America, South Africa, and China) are participating in the ETS 
from 2020 onwards. These economies only have a target from the year 
2030. For the periods when they do not have a reduction target (2020 and 
2025) and participate they are endowed with the baseline emissions of the 
sectors in the country participating in the ETS. 
 
Moreover, two other scenarios have been studied, which differ from the 
previous one in terms of the timing of participation of countries in the 
worldwide emission trading system. These two other cases could be 
considered as ‘lower flexibility cases’. In the first scenario all countries 
participate in the international ETS only when they have a reduction 
target (‘Scenario 2, participation when target’), at the time when they 
implement also a domestic permit system. This means that the possibility 
of buying emission permits to Group 3 countries in 2020-2025 
disappears, implying higher abatement costs in Group 1 and 2 countries 
to meet their targets. From the year 2030, however, Group 3 countries 
have emission reduction targets and then participate in the international 
ETS in what concerns their energy intensive sectors. 
 
The second case is even more restrictive than the previous in the Annex I 
countries are the only ones participating in the ETS (‘Scenario 3, Annex I 
only in ETS’). This means that for the 2020-2025 period Group 1 
countries are alone in the international ETS bubble. They cannot benefit 
from lower abatement costs of Group 2 countries (in other words, there 
are not CDMs) and, furthermore, that for the 2030 period, the Group 3 
trading possibilities do not exist either. All groups reach their reduction 
target by implementing a domestic permit system for all sectors. This is 
an extreme case that can illustrate the benefits of flexibility in terms of 
the overall cost of the global mitigation target and its regional 
distribution. 
 
4.2. Results 
 
 
4.2.1. Overview 
The overall results for the three scenarios are given in Table 4. The table 
represents for 2020 and 2030 the average GHG permit price, the 
economic welfare and the GHG emissions for five large players: two 
Annex I regions –USA and EU 27- and three large non-Annex I countries 
–China, India and Brazil-. More detailed tables, with results for all the 
model regions, also including the GDP changes, are given in the next 
section.  
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Table 4: Overview of the global scenarios  
(% difference compared to baseline) 
 
  Scenario 1: early participation Scenario 2: participation when target Scenario 3: Annex I only in ETS 
  2020 2030 2020 2030 2020 2030 
  Economic Welfare 
GHG 
Emissions 
Economic 
Welfare 
GHG 
Emissions 
Economic 
Welfare 
GHG 
Emissions 
Economic 
Welfare 
GHG 
Emissions 
Economic 
Welfare 
GHG 
Emissions 
Economic 
Welfare 
GHG 
Emissions 
USA -1.37% -39.5% -3.4% -52.1% -1.41% -46.6% -3.4% -52.1% -1.43% -47.4% -3.6% -61.7% 
EU27 -2.34% -28.1% -5.7% -41.6% -2.38% -33.6% -5.8% -41.6% -2.42% -34.4% -6.0% -50.3% 
Brazil -0.3% -4.8% -1.5% -15.0% -0.3% 3.6% -1.5% -15.0% -0.3% 3.6% -1.4% -12.3% 
India -0.9% 0.5% -1.6% -23.3% -0.7% 0.7% -1.6% -23.3% -0.8% 0.6% -2.4% -12.3% 
China 0.3% -29.5% -0.8% -32.8% -0.8% 1.8% -0.8% -32.7% -0.8% 1.6% -2.1% -12.3% 
World 
inequality 
aversion1=0 
-1.2% -25.9% -3.4% -37.2% -1.3% -23.6% -3.4% -37.2% -1.3% -23.6% -3.6% -37.2% 
World 
inequality 
aversion=1 
-0.4%   -1.4%   -0.5%   -1.4%   -0.5%   -1.5%   
GHG permit 
price 
(US$2001/ton 
CO2eq) 
  40.9   83.4   73.5   83.3   73.6   96.4 
 
                                                   
1 Inequality aversion parameter in the social welfare function allows taking into account the equity dimension, the higher the more important  
 
 
Concerning Scenario 1, the reduction targets for 2020 are already 
stringent for the developed world and further increase in 2030. This 
translates into a doubling of the GHG permit price, from 40.9 
US$2001/tCO2eq in 2020 to 83.4 US$2001/tCO2eq. In terms of welfare, 
the cost compared to the baseline remains limited for the USA and EU27, 
in a 1 to 2% range (compared to the baseline scenario levels), and 
increasing with the stringency of the target, to 4 to 6% in 2030. Note that 
in 2020 China experiences an improvement in its economic welfare of 
0.3% due to its significant sale of emission permits to Group 1 and 2 
countries (Brazil also sell permits, but to a much lower extent). China 
does not have a target in that period but reduces its emissions by nearly 
30% compared to the baseline scenario. In the 2030 period China has a 
target (12%), and reduces its emissions by almost 33% compared to the 
baseline. The welfare loss of China can be partly explained by the 
existence of a domestic target and also by the fall in global activity due to 
the stronger constraint in global emissions. 
 
The impact is more neutral for the other early participants such as Brazil: 
they benefit from the smaller decrease of activity in the Annex I countries 
but do not gain much from their early participation because they are less 
carbon intensive. 
 
In Scenario 2, with less flexibility in the international ETS, the GHG 
permit price increases significantly in the year 2020, compared to 
Scenario 1, almost doubling to 73.5 US$2001/tCO2eq. The non 
participation of some developing countries from 2020 onwards in this 
scenario increases slightly the welfare cost of the reduction for the Annex 
I countries before 2030. With regard to large developing countries, Brazil 
and India remain the same, but the Chinese economic welfare is worse 
off than in Scenario 1 because it does not receive the transfers from the 
sale of permits. 
 
Moreover, the overall gain from an early participation (scenario 1) lies 
predominantly in a further reduction of the World GHG emissions. 
Global emissions fall by 25.9% in Scenario 1 and by 23.6% in Scenario 
2.  
 
Concerning Scenario 3, where Group 1 countries can only make ETS 
within the same group, the GHG permit in 2030 become higher than that 
under Scenario 1. In 2030, both US and EU27 have slightly higher 
welfare losses, relative to Scenario 1. India and China welfare levels are 
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worse than under Scenario 1. They suffer from the higher decrease in 
activity in the Annex I countries and, furthermore, cannot benefit from 
their participation in the ETS.  
At sectoral level, the implementation of the ETS for the energy intensive 
sectors reduces the loss of competitiveness of these sectors in the 
countries having higher reduction target (Annex I countries). Early 
participation of China and others has the same positive effect. The shares 
of these sectors in Annex I countries in the World production are even 
slightly increasing in the two scenarios where all countries are in the 
ETS. They are decreasing when the ETS is limited to Annex I countries. 
 
4.2.2. Scenario 1: early participation in the ETS 
Table 5 presents the results for all countries of Scenario 1, including 
emissions targets and GDP changes. Under this scenario large developing 
countries (in particular, China, South Africa and Latin America) are 
participating with the energy intensive sectors in the international ETS 
from 2020 onwards. It is mainly China which contributes to the ETS, 
with a reduction of its emissions of almost 30% compared to the baseline. 
USA, Canada, Australia and EU27 are benefiting mostly from the ETS 
and therefore also from their participation: their emissions are reduced by 
approximately 10 percentage points compared to their target. Group 2 
countries are also buying in the international ETS. In 2030 China, India 
and South Africa are the main sellers in the ETS, with the largest 
emissions reduction compared to their target.  
 
In terms of the macroeconomic adjustment (measured with the change of 
GDP), due to the GHG emission constraint the reduction remains limited 
in annualised terms. For the EU27 region, in 2020 the GPD is estimated 
to be 2.1% below the level of the baseline scenario. Annualising that 
figure over a fifteen period means an annual reduction of GDP growth of 
around 0.14%. For 2030 the GDP change is 5%, and annualised translates 
into 0.21%. The policy reduces the average growth rate of EU27 from 
2% a year in the baseline scenario till 2020 to 1.9% a year in the policy 
scenario and till 2030 from 1.8% to 1.6%. The annualised GDP change 
for the world economy is 0.11% and 0.17%, respectively for 2020 and 
2030.  
 
 
Table 5: Scenario with early participation in ETS 
(% difference compared to baseline. GHG permit price in US$2001/tCO2eq) 
 
 
  2020 2030 
  GHG Emissions 
welfare GDP 
GHG Emissions 
welfare GDP 
  target scenario target scenario 
Group 1 
(Annex I) USA -50% -40% -1.4% -1.9% -64% -52% -3.4% -4.5% 
 
Canada -46% -36% -2.5% -2.8% -61% -50% -6.0% -7.0% 
EU27 -37% -28% -2.3% -2.1% -52% -42% -5.7% -5.0% 
Other European countries -25% -22% -1.2% -1.1% -46% -41% -2.9% -3.4% 
Former Soviet Union -38% -38% -3.3% -4.5% -53% -49% -7.7% -10.3% 
Australia & New Zealand -33% -26% 0.1% -1.4% -51% -40% -0.9% -4.5% 
Japan -37% -28% -1.0% -1.1% -54% -42% -3.0% -3.1% 
Group 2 Mexico & Venezuela -23% -18% -1.6% -1.0% -45% -34% -5.1% -3.7% 
 
South & East Mediterranean -23% -22% -1.1% -1.7% -45% -35% -4.2% -5.7% 
Middle East -23% -22% -1.2% -1.8% -45% -39% -4.6% -5.3% 
East South East Asia -23% -21% -0.7% -1.1% -45% -36% -2.3% -3.4% 
Group 3 Brazil 0% -5% -0.3% -0.6% -12% -15% -1.5% -2.2% 
 
Rest of Latin America 0% -3% -0.3% -0.6% -12% -13% -1.4% -2.2% 
China 0% -30% 0.3% -0.5% -12% -33% -0.8% -2.5% 
South Africa 0% -5% 0.7% -0.3% -12% -23% 1.5% -1.0% 
India 0% 0% -0.9% -1.0% -12% -23% -1.6% -2.4% 
Rest of Asia 0% 1% -0.3% -0.5% -12% -14% -1.2% -1.9% 
 Middle Africa 0% 2% -0.8% -0.6% 0% 6% -2.0% -2.5% 
 World (inequality aversion=0) -24% -26% -1.2% -1.7% -37% -37% -3.4% -4.2% 
 World (inequality aversion=1)   -0.4%   -1.4% 
 GHG permit price 41 83 
 
 
If India would also participate in 2020, it would be beneficial for this 
country and for the world. The GHG permit price and the World GHG 
emissions would slightly decrease. China would however gain less from 
its early participation having to share the demand of permits with India.  
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4.2.3. Scenario 2: participation when emission reduction target is 
imposed 
The non participation of China, Brazil and the other in the international 
ETS in 2020 increases the marginal cost of reduction, as already noted. 
The GHG permit price at a world level is very high in 2020 (compared to 
Scenario 1) as the reduction targets for 2020 are already stringent for the 
developed world. In terms of GDP adjustment cost, the deviation with 
respect to the baseline remains rather close to the previous scenario with 
early participation. 
 
A change compared to the previous scenario is that in 2020 the FSU 
becomes the seller of permits within the Group 1 and 2 bubble, replacing 
China. Indeed, in terms of welfare and GDP changes most Annex I 
(Group 1) countries are worse off than in Scenario 1. The FSU is better 
off because of its sale of permits in the ETS market. 
 
The GHG permit price reaches 73.5US$ in 2020 and increases only 
slightly in 2030 though the reduction target is much higher. The 
participation in 2030 of great emitters such as China and India with still 
low reduction targets in 2030 explains the low increase. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Scenario with participation when target imposed (% difference compared to baseline. GHG permit price in 
US$2001/tCO2eq) 
  2020 2030 
  GHG Emissions welfare GDP GHG Emissions welfare GDP   target scenario target scenario 
Group 1 
(Annex I) 
USA -50% -47% -1.4% -2.1% -64% -52% -3.4% -4.6% 
Canada -46% -42% -2.6% -2.9% -61% -50% -6.0% -7.1% 
EU27 -37% -34% -2.4% -2.2% -52% -42% -5.8% -5.1% 
Other European countries -25% -23% -1.4% -1.1% -46% -41% -3.0% -3.4% 
Former Soviet Union -38% -46% -2.0% -3.4% -53% -49% -7.9% -10.4% 
Australia & New Zealand -33% -32% 0.1% -1.5% -51% -40% -1.0% -4.6% 
Japan -37% -34% -1.0% -1.1% -54% -42% -3.0% -3.1% 
Group 2 
Mexico & Venezuela -23% -22% -1.6% -1.0% -45% -34% -5.1% -3.7% 
South & East Mediterranean -23% -28% -0.9% -1.7% -45% -35% -4.4% -5.8% 
Middle East -23% -27% -1.2% -2.0% -45% -39% -4.7% -5.5% 
East South East Asia -23% -27% -0.5% -1.1% -45% -36% -2.4% -3.5% 
Group 3 
Brazil 0% 4% -0.3% -0.2% -12% -15% -1.5% -2.2% 
Rest of Latin America 0% 2% -0.4% -0.5% -12% -13% -1.4% -2.2% 
China 0% 2% -0.8% -0.8% -12% -33% -0.8% -2.3% 
South Africa 0% 2% -0.2% -0.6% -12% -23% 1.6% -0.8% 
India 0% 1% -0.7% -0.9% -12% -23% -1.6% -2.4% 
Rest of Asia 0% 1% -0.3% -0.4% -12% -14% -1.3% -1.9% 
 Middle Africa 0% 2% -0.7% -0.5% 0% 6% -2.0% -2.5% 
 World (inequality aversion=0) -24% -24% -1.3% -1.7% -37% -37% -3.4% -4.3% 
 World (inequality aversion=1)   -0,5%   -1.4% 
 GHG permit price 74 83 
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4.2.4. Scenario 3: Annex I only participating in ETS 
In this scenario only Annex I countries are participating in the ETS and 
this limits the possibility of benefiting from the low cost GHG reduction 
potentials of large countries like China, or from Group 2 countries. For 
2020 the results are close to scenario 2 (the differences are due to the non 
participation of Group 2). In 2030 however the GHG permit price is 
higher than in the previous scenario, and the cost in terms of welfare and 
GDP growth is also higher. This is as expected as limiting the 
participation in the ETS is less cost efficient. While in 2030 all Annex I 
countries are worse off compared to Scenario 1, the FSU appears again as 
the seller of permits to its Annex I partners, experiencing lower welfare 
and GDP changes than in Scenario 1. 
 
On sectoral level, limiting the ETS to the Annex I countries increases the 
reduction cost for the sectors and especially for the energy intensive 
sectors. It also deteriorates the competitive position of those sectors in 
Annex I because of the lower target in the non Annex I countries.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Scenario with Annex I only in ETS 
 
(% difference compared to baseline. GHG permit price in US$2001/tCO2eq) 
 
  2020 2030 
  GHG Emissions welfare GDP GHG Emissions welfare GDP   target scenario target scenario 
Group 1 
(Annex I) 
USA -50% -47% -1.4% -2.1% -64% -62% -3.6% -4.9% 
Canada -46% -43% -2.6% -3.0% -61% -59% -6.4% -7.5% 
EU27 -37% -34% -2.4% -2.2% -52% -50% -6.0% -5.4% 
Other European countries -25% -24% -1.4% -1.1% -46% -44% -3.2% -3.5% 
Former Soviet Union -38% -47% -1.6% -3.1% -53% -61% -5.0% -8.9% 
Australia & New Zealand -33% -33% 0.1% -1.5% -51% -50% -0.9% -5.1% 
Japan -37% -35% -1.0% -1.1% -54% -51% -3.0% -3.2% 
Group 2 
Mexico & Venezuela -23% -23% -1.6% -1.0% -45% -45% -5.5% -4.1% 
South & East Mediterranean -23% -23% -1.1% -1.6% -45% -45% -4.8% -6.5% 
Middle East -23% -23% -1.3% -1.9% -45% -45% -4.9% -5.8% 
East South East Asia -23% -23% -0.6% -1.1% -45% -45% -2.4% -3.9% 
Group 3 
Brazil 0% 4% -0.3% -0.3% -12% -12% -1.4% -1.9% 
Rest of Latin America 0% 2% -0.4% -0.5% -12% -12% -1.3% -2.0% 
China 0% 2% -0.8% -0.8% -12% -12% -2.1% -2.7% 
South Africa 0% 2% -0.2% -0.6% -12% -12% 0.2% -1.4% 
India 0% 1% -0.8% -0.9% -12% -12% -2.4% -2.7% 
Rest of Asia 0% 1% -0.3% -0.5% -12% -12% -1.3% -1.8% 
 Middle Africa   2% -0.7% -0.5%   6% -1.8% -2.3% 
 World (inequality aversion=0) -24% -24% -1.3% -1.8% -37% -37% -3.6% -4.5% 
 World (inequality aversion=1)   -0,5%   -1.5% 
 GHG permit price 74 96 
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5. Additional scenarios 
5.1. Autonomous EU policy in 2020 
If EU acts alone till 2020 with the possibility of CDM with China, the 
cost for Europe is limited but the benefits in terms of World GHG 
emission reductions are also small (around -3%). The emission reduction 
through CDM is limited to 30% of the EU target for 2020. This strategy 
of Europe can be seen as a first step towards a cooperative climate 
agreement. 
 
 
Table 8:  EU autonomous policy in 2020 with 21% reduction target 
compared to 1990 
 
(% difference compared to baseline) 
 
 without CDM with CDM 
  Economic Welfare 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
GHG 
Emissions 
Economic 
Welfare 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
GHG 
Emissions 
USA -0.1% -0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
EU27 -1.1% -1.1% -27.4% -0.2% -0.2% -5.1% 
Brazil -0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
India -0.1% -0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
China -0.1% -0.1% 0.2% 0.1% -0.1% -15.3% 
World         -0.3% -0.3% -3.3% 0.0% -0.1% -3.5% 
GHG permit price 
(US$2001/ton CO2eq)     55.5     4.7 
 
 
 
5.2. Impact of capital mobility 
In the global scenarios above it was assumed that there was no capital1 
mobility between regions beyond the one implied by the new investment. 
To evaluate the possible impact of delocalisation at an increased speed, a 
scenario was run where it was assumed that capital was also mobile 
between regions. The comparison - however, is not straightforward. It 
can only give some indications because, as there is no reason to assume 
that capital could be more mobile with a carbon constraint than without 
such a constraint, the same assumption about capital mobility is also 
imposed in the baseline. Thus the emissions are not exactly the same in 
both reference cases.  
 
Assuming full capital mobility shifts the activity towards the fast growing 
and developing world in the baseline. This means a decrease of the 
emissions in the developed and thus a decrease in their reduction effort 
compared to the baseline, the target compared to 1990 remaining the 
same. In 2030 the overall target and cost are rather similar in both 
scenarios at the world level but there are differences on country level 
mostly because a change in the reduction effort.  
 
At sectoral level, the differences are not as great as the ETS already 
allows a more evenly distribution of the reduction cost.  
 
 
                                                   
1 Capital here is productive capital, financial capital is mobile in all scenarios and reflected in the change 
in current account. 
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Table 9:  Scenario with early participation in ETS with and without capital mobility  
 
(% difference compared to baseline. GHG permit price in US$2001/tCO2eq) 
 
  without capital mobility with capital mobility 
  2030 2030 
  GHG Emissions welfare GDP GHG Emissions welfare GDP   target scenario target scenario 
Group 1 
(Annex I) 
USA -64% -52% -3.4% -4.5% -61% -50% -3.0% -4.0% 
Canada -61% -50% -6.0% -7.0% -60% -49% -6.4% -7.8% 
EU27 -52% -42% -5.7% -5.0% -47% -38% -5.0% -4.2% 
Other European countries -46% -41% -2.9% -3.4% -45% -40% -2.1% -2.5% 
Former Soviet Union -53% -49% -7.7% -10.3% -46% -47% -6.0% -9.4% 
Australia & New Zealand -51% -40% -0.9% -4.5% -63% -50% -2.7% -7.8% 
Japan -54% -42% -3.0% -3.1% -58% -46% -1.6% -1.7% 
Group 2 
Mexico & Venezuela -45% -34% -5.1% -3.7% -55% -43% -10.2% -8.5% 
South & East Mediterranean -45% -35% -4.2% -5.7% -55% -44% -8.7% -12.2% 
Middle East -45% -39% -4.6% -5.3% -55% -47% -9.0% -10.7% 
East South East Asia -45% -36% -2.3% -3.4% -55% -44% -2.0% -3.5% 
Group 3 
Brazil -12% -23% -1.6% -2.4% -16% -28% -3.6% -5.5% 
Rest of Latin America -12% -14% -1.2% -1.9% -16% -18% -0.3% -0.3% 
China -12% -15% -1.5% -2.2% -16% -19% -0.3% -1.0% 
South Africa -12% -13% -1.4% -2.2% -16% -17% -0.9% -1.5% 
India -12% -33% -0.8% -2.5% -16% -33% -1.3% -3.1% 
Rest of Asia -12% -23% 1.5% -1.0% -16% -26% 1.0% -1.7% 
 Middle Africa 0% 6% -2.0% -2.5% 0% 10% 1.3% 1.9% 
 World (inequality aversion=0) -37% -37% -3.4% -4.2% -37% -37% -3.4% -4.2% 
 World (inequality aversion=1)   -1.4%   -1.5% 
 GHG permit price 83 83 
 
 
 
5.3. Current account equilibrium 
In the previous scenarios no specific constraint was imposed on the 
countries’ current account. The general equilibrium mechanisms implicit 
in the model structure will balance the country overall equilibrium 
through price and quantity changes such as the savings by the different 
agents (inclusive the ROW) allows financing the investment demand in 
the country. This implies perfect financial capital mobility between 
regions. It seems however also interesting to examine what the impact is 
of less capital mobility, what if countries are more reluctant to finance 
investment in other countries. The scenario takes into account this issue 
by imposing a current account constraint, that the share of current 
account deficit/surplus to GDP should remain the same as in the 
reference case. Countries where the current account deteriorates with the 
climate policy will have to find resources within their countries to finance 
their investment or decrease their investment. Countries with a surplus 
will have more resources to spend within the country. This adjustment 
will occur through a change of the domestic interest rate.  
 
Overall the cost is negative mainly because the negative impact of the 
decrease in activity in the Annex I countries is higher than the positive 
effect that the decrease of the interest rate could have on the domestic 
demand. All regions are worse off than in the case of no constraint in the 
current account. 
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Table 10: Scenario with early participation in ETS with free current account and with fixed current account in terms of 
GDP  (% difference compared to baseline. GHG permit price in US$2001/tCO2eq) 
 
  no constraint on current account constraint on current account 
  2030 2030 
  GHG Emissions welfare GDP GHG Emissions welfare GDP   target scenario target scenario 
Group 1 
(Annex I) 
USA -64% -52% -3.4% -4.5% -64% -52% -3.8% -5.1% 
Canada -61% -50% -6.0% -7.0% -61% -50% -6.6% -7.6% 
EU27 -52% -42% -5.7% -5.0% -52% -42% -7.3% -5.6% 
Other European countries -46% -41% -2.9% -3.4% -46% -41% -3.3% -3.9% 
Former Soviet Union -53% -49% -7.7% -10.3% -53% -50% -6.7% -11.4% 
Australia & New Zealand -51% -40% -0.9% -4.5% -51% -40% -1.1% -5.1% 
Japan -54% -42% -3.0% -3.1% -54% -42% -4.5% -3.5% 
Group 2 
Mexico & Venezuela -45% -34% -5.1% -3.7% -45% -34% -4.9% -4.3% 
South & East Mediterranean -45% -35% -4.2% -5.7% -45% -36% -4.8% -6.2% 
Middle East -45% -39% -4.6% -5.3% -45% -39% -4.7% -5.9% 
East South East Asia -45% -36% -2.3% -3.4% -45% -36% -2.4% -4.2% 
Group 3 
Brazil -12% -23% -1.6% -2.4% -12% -23% -2.4% -2.9% 
Rest of Latin America -12% -14% -1.2% -1.9% -12% -14% -1.7% -2.6% 
China -12% -15% -1.5% -2.2% -12% -15% -1.8% -2.8% 
South Africa -12% -13% -1.4% -2.2% -12% -13% -1.9% -2.7% 
India -12% -33% -0.8% -2.5% -12% -32% -1.8% -3.1% 
Rest of Asia -12% -23% 1.5% -1.0% -12% -23% 2.9% -1.9% 
 Middle Africa 0% 6% -2.0% -2.5% 0% 5% -2.5% -3.1% 
 World (inequality aversion=0) -37% -37% -3.4% -4.2% -37% -37% -4.0% -4.8% 
 World (inequality aversion=1)   -1.4%   -1.7% 
 GHG permit price 83 83 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has assessed the consequences of targeting the EU 2°C 
objective using the multi-sectoral, multi-country general equilibrium 
GEM-E3 global model. The model allows to get insights into the order of 
magnitude of the world and regional welfare changes required to meet 
that temperature target, within a sound theoretical framework, that of 
general equilibrium theory, while using consistent National Accounts 
statistics. Several sensitivity analyses to key assumptions of the model 
and the policy setup have been also carried out. The focus is on the 
period till 2030, but it is clear that to reach the 2° target of the EU further 
reduction will have to be done. 
 
Under a broad participation scheme, in the year 2020 the average GHG 
permit price is estimated at 40 US$2001/tCO2eq. That cost almost 
doubles if there is less flexibility in the international emission trading 
system. In particular, if Annex I countries cannot buy permits form the 
rest of the world, not only most of Annex I countries are worse off in 
terms of welfare and GDP changes, but also some developing countries 
are worse off, as they cannot benefit from the extra revenues from the 
sale of permit rights in the international ETS or CDMs.  
 
The estimated GHG permit price for the 2030 period is 83 
US$2001/tCO2eq, assuming broad participation (high flexibility) in the 
international ETS market. 
 
The overall change in annual GDP for the world economy is estimated to 
be 0.11% in 2020, and 0.17% in 2030. For the EU27 region those figures 
are 0.14% and 0.21%, respectively. If the EU would reduce unilaterally 
its emissions the annualised GDP changes would be below those figures, 
even without having access to CDM. 
 
The model assumes that capital is not mobile across countries. When that 
assumption is removed, allowing for full capital mobility at world scale, 
the GHG permit price in 2020 becomes lower (33.8 US$2001/tCO2eq), 
because there is less activity in the baseline scenario, and therefore the 
absolute GHG emission targets are less costly to meet. 
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In another sensitivity run, countries are not allowed to deviate from the 
current account position in the baseline scenario. Most regions 
experience larger welfare losses, because of this additional constraint. 
 
A number of caveats must be mentioned. In interpreting the results from 
the CGE based analysis one should take into account the modelling 
assumptions made on key issues. The GEM-E3 model version used for 
this study assumes that there are no imperfections in goods, capital, 
labour and permit market. The values for fundamental parameters such as 
production or Armington elasticities have been selected from literature 
surveys and were not econometrically estimated for the exact regional 
and sectoral dimension of the model. The effects of the climate policies 
computed with the model are driven by relative price changes in all the 
markets of the economy.  
 
This simulation, anyhow, has considered that there is no global perfect 
market for emission trading, covering all sectors and countries and this 
leads to higher abatement costs estimates compared to studies assuming 
perfect carbon markets. 
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8. Annexes 
8.1. Annex 1: Countries/Regions in GEM-E3 world 
The country aggregation is conditioned by the country aggregation in 
GTAP6 database which is used for GEM-E3. 
 
Number Code Name Number Code Name 
1 AUZ Australia  14 EU27 Austria  
   New Zealand     Belgium  
   Rest of Oceania    Denmark  
2 CHN China     Finland  
   Hong Kong     France  
3 JPN Japan     Germany  
4 EAS Korea     United Kingdom  
   Taiwan     Greece  
   Rest of East Asia    Ireland  
   Indonesia     Italy  
   Malaysia     Luxembourg  
   Philippines     Netherlands  
   Singapore     Portugal  
   Thailand     Spain  
5 RAS Viet Nam     Sweden  
   Rest of Southeast Asia    Bulgaria  
   Bangladesh     Cyprus  
   Sri Lanka     Czech Republic  
   Rest of South Asia    Hungary  
6 IND  India     Malta  
7 CAN Canada     Poland  
   Rest of North America    Romania  
8 USA  United States of America     Slovakia  
9 MEV Mexico     Slovenia  
   Venezuela     Estonia  
10 BRA Brazil     Latvia  
11 LAM Colombia     Lithuania  
   Peru  15 OEU Switzerland  
   Rest of Andean Pact    Rest of EFTA 
   Argentina     Rest of Europe 
   Chile  16 FSU Russian Federation  
   Uruguay     Rest of Former Soviet 
Union    Rest of South America 17 MED Turkey  
   Central America     Morocco  
   
Rest of Free Trade Area of the 
Americas    Tunisia  
   Rest of the Caribbean    Rest of North Africa 
 
 
12 MEA Rest of Middle East    Albania  
13 SAFR Botswana     Croatia  
   South Africa  18 MAFR Malawi  
   Rest of South African Customs 
Union 
   Mozambique  
   
Rest of Southern African 
Development Community    Tanzania  
       Zambia  
       Zimbabwe  
       Madagascar  
       Uganda  
          
Rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
8.2. Annex 2: sectoral breakdown 
The GTAP 57 sectors have been aggregated into the following 
classification: 
 
No GEM-E3 Sector 
01 Agriculture 
02 Coal 
03 Oil 
04 Gas 
05 Electricity 
06 Ferrous and non ferrous metals 
07 Chemical Products 
08 Other energy intensive 
09 Electric Goods 
10 Transport equipment 
11 Other Equipment Goods 
12 Consumer Goods Industries 
13 Construction 
14 Telecommunication Services 
15 Transport 
16 Services of credit and insurances 
17 Other Market Services 
18 Non Market Services 
 
